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Abstract
This JIKO Policy Paper reviews the concept of 
additionality in the context of the Paris Agree-
ment. Additionality is a key criterion that helps 
to maintain the environmental integrity of the 
Paris Agreement, especially when units created 
under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting 
purposes whether that is by Parties in order to 
meet their NDCs or whether by other entities 
with legal mitigation obligations, for example 
air carriers under the new CORSIA scheme of 
international aviation. 
This Policy Paper lays the conceptual ground-
work for an important policy debate of the day:
how to operationalize additionality for interna-
tional market-based cooperative climate action 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It does 
so by first reviewing key concepts such as off-
setting, environmental integrity, and baseline.
Subsequently, it explores the context of addi-
tionality under the Paris Agreement. More spe-
cifically it discusses what should be counted as 
the baseline for additionality demonstration.
Status quo and business as usual, arguably,
should not be considered adequate baselines 
as all countries now have an obligation to de-
velop and implement NDCs. The NDCs them-
selves, however, are also not particularly suita-
ble as baselines for a variety of reasons. Ulti-
Ultimately, any form of Article 6 cooperation 
should only be used when it serves as a leg-up 
for the host country of an activity to embark on 
a truly transformational development pathway 
that is compatible with the long-term goals of
the Paris Agreement.
The subsequent chapter then highlights the 
challenges with establishing additionality, that 
is establishing a causal relationship between a 
policy intervention and a proposed activity.
Given the high degree of uncertainty with re-
spect to the forms and types of activities that 
may eventually be realized under Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement, the first challenge is to de-
fine the start and endpoint of a presumed caus-
al chain. Only then is it possible to identify un-
met necessary conditions for the proposed 
activity and to assess whether the respective 
policy intervention in principle addresses the 
unmet condition and whether it is fit to resolve 
the deficit. 
Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of in-
ternational governance with respect to addi-
tionality. The analysis shows that the potential 
of international governance is severely limited,
because it would almost inevitably require an 
assessment of the adequacy of a given host 
countries mitigation ambition. This, of course,
collides with considerations of national sover-
eignty which make it highly unlikely that an in-
ternational governance body would receive a 
mandate for such assessments in the first place. 
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1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement marks a turning point in 
international climate governance. It established 
a new international legal architecture that can 
help to govern the transformation of global
economies and societies required to attain the 
ambitious goals of the agreement (Hermwille 
2016). The key vehicle to this transformation are 
the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
that every country needs to develop, communi-
cate and update every five years as of 2020 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4). The first round of (in-
tended) NDCs was announced already in run-
up to the Paris conference by the vast majority 
of countries. However, the level of ambition ex-
pressed in those (I)NDCs falls significantly short 
of what is necessary to collectively embark on a 
transformation pathway that is compatible with 
limiting global warming well below 2 °C (UN-
FCCC 2016c).
The Paris Agreement has various in-built op-
tions to address this shortfall of mitigation am-
bition over time. One of those options is out-
lined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Article 
6.1 enables voluntary cooperation among par-
ties to the Agreement “in the implementation 
of their nationally determined contributions to 
allow for higher ambition in their mitigation 
and adaptation actions and to promote sus-
tainable development and environmental in-
tegrity” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 6.1).
There are a couple of ways in which Article 6 
could achieve this contribution to raising ambi-
tion (Healy 2017; Kreibich forthcoming). How-
ever, there is also a risk that the use of market-
based cooperative climate action actually un-
dermines overall ambition, particularly if inter-
nationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
(ITMOs) generated in one country are used to 
offset/reduce domestic climate action in anoth-
er. Although any mechanism(s) under Article 6 
clearly must not operate as a pure zero sum
game as was the case with the Kyoto mecha-
nisms, the possibility to use ITMOs as offsets – 
be it by Parties to the Paris Agreement or, po-
tentially, other actors with mitigation obliga-
tions such as airlines under the new Carbon 
Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for Interna-
tional Aviation (CORSIA) – threatens to under-
mine the environmental integrity of the inter-
national climate regime.1 The very definition of 
“offsetting” is that a harm caused in one place is 
compensated by an activity “that results in ex-
tra good that is equivalent – in magnitude, ap-
proximate timing, and recipient population – to 
the original harm done” (Gillenwater 2012, 2–3). 
Offsetting threatens environmental integrity of 
the Paris Agreement, when the “extra good” is
actually not something “extra”.  
To assess the “extra”, the additionality concept 
has been introduced. According to Gillenwater 
“additionality is about assessing causation.
It is about deciding if a proposed activity is 
being caused to happen by a policy inter-
vention” (Gillenwater 2012, 3).  
 
1It bears noting that the offset nature of any mitigation 
units generated under Article 6 is determined not by the 
modalities by which those units are supplied, but rather 
by the demand side and the way in which the units are 
utilized. One key concern is that some countries may use 
ITMOs to buy themselves out of serious domestic efforts. 
One way to mitigate this would be to determine that 
countries can use ITMOs only supplemental to the high-
est possible ambition of domestic climate action. The 
notion of supplementarity was already introduced in the 
Kyoto Protocol but never quantified in any meaningful 
way. When the ambition of the Paris Agreement is taken 
seriously, this would mean that Parties should only be 
able to use ITMOs towards the NDCs on the condition 
that they themselves have embarked on a transforma-
tional pathway compatible with limiting global warming 
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The concept of additionality is not mentioned 
in the Paris Agreement itself.2 And even the de-
cisions adopting the Paris Agreement refer to 
additionality only in the context of the mandate 
to develop modalities and procedures for the 
“mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and support sustain-
able development” established in Article 6.4 
(UNFCCC 2016b, para. 37). However, given the 
essential contribution of additionality to safe-
guard environmental integrity and the explicit
mandate expressed in Art. 6.1 “to promote envi-
ronmental integrity” it is in our view necessary 
to further extend and adapt the additionality 
concept to the Paris Agreement and any form
of market-based cooperative climate action 
under its Article 6.
Yet, doing so is challenging in some ways. It is 
unclear, for example, what kind(s) of the “policy 
interventions” Gillenwater refers to are going to
be pursued under Article 6. Or does even the 
mere existence of Article 6 constitute such a 
policy intervention? Is it the option to trade 
ITMOs and use them for offsets? Is it the reve-
nue stream associated with the trade of ITMOs? 
And how is an “Article 6 intervention” to be dis-
tinguished from other policy interventions initi-
ated under the Paris Agreement: conditional 
and unconditional NDCs, and/or financial sup-
port provided corresponding to Article 9 of the 
Paris Agreement.  
Another challenge relates to the notion of the 
“proposed activity”. Contrary to Articles 6 and 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which established 
Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM), Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement does not specify that cooperation is
to take the form of “project activities”. It is cur-
rently unclear what form market-based Article 6 
cooperation may take, it could be individual
 
2In contrast to that the Kyoto Protocol explicitly mentions 
additionality both in Article 6.1b (Joint Implementation) 
and Article 12.5c (Clean Development Mechanism). 
projects as in CDM/JI, a mitigation programme, 
or even a (sectoral) policy. Parties currently 
seem to converge on a consensus that all 
scopes of activities should be allowed 
(Obergassel 2017). Especially policy-based ap-
proaches may become challenging, because 
policies often do not directly reduce emissions 
but only indirectly by setting incentives. The 
longer the causal chain between the “proposed 
activity” and the final emission reduction, the 
more challenging it may become to demon-
strate causality, particularly when other causal 
factors are present.
The role of the additionality concept is not con-
fined to safeguarding environmental integrity 
in the narrow sense outlined above. It has been 
highlighted that additionality is also a prerequi-
site for cost effectiveness, given that financial
resources to implement mitigation activities are 
scarce: “Additionality is a prerequisite to a so-
cially and economically efficient allocation” 
(World Bank 2016, 2). This is irrespective of 
whether ITMOs are used for offsetting or not. 
When funding is provided for activities that ac-
tually do not require such support, this can lead 
to windfall profits for those that receive unnec-
essary support whereas other activities will not 
receive the required support to actually get im-
plemented (see also Hermwille and Mersmann
2015). Such misallocation of scarce funding will 
make achieving the ambitious objectives of the 
Paris Agreement even harder.
This policy paper sets out to lay the conceptual
groundwork for a more informed discussion of 
the challenges with applying and operationaliz-
ing the additionality concept in the context of 
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2 Key Concepts and Their 
Relation to Additionality
According to the World Bank (2016), all current 
mitigation crediting standards and schemes 
share a common definition of additionality:
A credit is considered additional if the emissions re-
duction that underpins the credit would not have oc-
curred in the absence of the activity that generates 
the unit (the BAU scenario). (World Bank 2016, 3)
This definition, however, is only of limited value 
when considering Article 6. First, it is not even 
clear whether or not actual “credits” or any form
of units will eventually be issued that can be 
considered a commodity or whether or not 
ITMOs will simply be transferred on a bilateral 
and ad hoc basis without a formal or even in-
formal international market. Given the wide 
range of possible forms of cooperation, it seems 
at least questionable whether or not ITMOs will 
be units with comparable properties.
Moreover, as Gillenwater (2012) highlights, the 
definition of additionality presented above can 
easily become circular if the definition of the 
BAU scenario is not carefully considered. If for 
the BAU one considers a hypothetical case ask-
ing what would have happened without the 
project/activity, one ends up confounding 
cause and effect. Instead, Gillenwater suggests 
to consider the “policy intervention” for as-
sessing the BAU scenario. 
For the existing crediting schemes that apply 
the above-mentioned definition of additionali-
ty, the policy intervention is seldom explicit but
nevertheless relatively straight forward: the is-
suance of tradable credits that promise a reve-
nue stream to support the proposed activity.
Yet, in the absence of a clear picture how and 
what kind of policy interventions can be ac-
commodated by Article 6, it may be necessary 
to revert to a more abstract definition of addi-
tionality presented above: “[A]dditionality is
about assessing causation. It is about deciding 
if a proposed activity is being caused to happen 
by a policy intervention” (Gillenwater 2012, 3).  
In the context of the Paris Agreement, we need 
to add another layer: it is necessary to consider 
the relationship with the host country’s domes-
tic climate policy as expressed in its NDC and 
the “policy intervention” that is supposed to 
trigger transferable emission reductions. The 
following section explores and explains a num-
ber of key concepts that are instrumental to ex-
plore the question of additionality under the 
Paris Agreement in more detail.  
2.1 Offsetting 
The concept of offsetting can be defined as fol-
lows: A harm caused in one place is compen-
sated by an activity “that results in extra good 
that is equivalent – in magnitude, approximate 
timing, and recipient population – to the origi-
nal harm done” (Gillenwater 2012, 2–3). 
The very use of the concept of offsetting under 
the Kyoto Protocol has been subject to fierce 
criticism. From the start, critics argued that the 
possibility to use offsets lifted the pressure off 
buyer countries to transform their own econo-
mies (Luhmann and Sterk 2008). When imple-
mentation of the Kyoto mechanisms was un-
derway, there increasingly emerged a sense 
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of the mechanisms should also yield a “net at-
mospheric benefit” (Cames 2009; Schneider 
2012).
While it has not been possible to implement 
achievement of “net atmospheric benefits” in 
the Kyoto mechanisms, under the Paris Agree-
ment the “zero sum game” of pure offsetting 
must not continue. This is clear from two pas-
sages in Article 6: (1) Article 6.1 clearly states 
that voluntary cooperation on the implementa-
tion of NDCs is supposed “to allow for higher 
ambition” (on the issue of ambition raising see 
Kreibich forthcoming). And (2) the mechanism
established in Article 6.4d foresees that the ap-
plication of the mechanism shall ”deliver an
overall mitigation in global emissions“ (UNFCCC 
2016a; for a discussion of the genesis of this 
provision see Marcu 2016).
Although from this it is quite clear that market-
based cooperative action must result in net 
“atmospheric benefits” (Cames 2009; Schneider 
2012), it is also evident that tradable units gen-
erated under Art. 6 can still be used to compen-
sate domestic climate action. Art. 6.2 enables 
“the use of internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes towards nationally determined 
contributions” (UNFCCC 2016a). And a range of 
countries have indicated to do so in their
(i)NDCs (Obergassel and Gornik 2015). Admit-
tedly, this was done before the role and setup 
of international carbon markets under the Paris 
Agreement was adopted. In fact, the role of 
market-based instruments under the Paris 
Agreement was very uncertain until the very 
last hours of COP21 (cf. Obergassel et al. 2015).
Moreover, it is not unlikely that any units gen-
erated under Article 6 will also be used under 
CORSIA that has been introduced by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
(ICAO 2016).
However, there are also ways in which units 
could be used for non-offsetting purposes. Arti-
cle 6 and in particular the mechanism estab-
lished in accordance with Art. 6.4 could serve as 
means to keep track of mitigation action sup-
ported by international climate finance, in the 
mode of results-based finance (Kreibich 2014).
Also, Parties could define commitments to 
achieve mitigation outcomes abroad that are 
perfectly complementary to any domestic tar-
gets. Ultimately, the more flexibility there is to
substitute domestic climate action with climate 
action abroad, the stronger the offsetting char-
acter.
2.2 Environmental Integrity 
The Paris Agreement sets ambitious long-term 
goals at the international level. However, it 
does not break down this collective goal into 
specific responsibilities of individual countries. 
Instead, it has established a mandatory proce-
dure to develop “nationally determined contri-
butions” (NDCs) and to implement policies to 
achieve the self-imposed climate change miti-
gation objectives outlined in the NDCs. So what 
does “environmental integrity” mean in this 
context? 
Some of the submissions from Parties note that 
there is no clear, universally adopted definition 
of the term. Most submissions converge on a 
view that environmental integrity means that 
one carbon unit represents one ton of CO2e and 
is counted only once towards a commitment.
One submission posits that environmental in-
tegrity should also address potential areas of 
conflicts with other environment-related as-
pects, for example, the conservation of biodi-
versity (Obergassel 2017).
The word “integrity” is defined as “the quality or 
state of being complete or undivided” (Merri-
am-Webster 2017). For the purpose of the sub-
sequent analysis, the most practical way of 
comprehending environmental integrity as “a 
situation where the individual elements or 
mechanisms of an overarching instrument do 
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this instrument.” (Kreibich and Hermwille 2016, 
1). The long-term objectives of the Paris 
Agreement are expressed in Article 2: limiting
global warming to well below 2°C, fostering ad-
aptation and climate resilient low GHG emis-
sions development, and financial flows that are 
consistent with such climate resilient and low
GHG emission development (UNFCCC 2016a,
Art. 2). Therefore, a corollary of this definition of 
environmental integrity is that the use of Article 
6 mechanisms and international transfer of mit-
igation outcomes to offset domestic mitigation 
efforts in the importing country must not un-
dermine the effectiveness of other elements 
(e.g. NDCs, climate finance, etc.) to achieve the 
long-term objectives.
Environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement 
entails two dimensions (cf. Kreibich and 
Hermwille 2016):  
• The static challenge refers to the integrity 
of NDCs in the current period. The utiliza-
tion of Article 6 mechanisms must not cre-
ate loopholes that would allow parties to 
avoid or dodge domestic climate action in
accordance with their current NDC. This in-
cludes, for example, the issue of double 
counting of units generated under Article 6 
(cf. Schneider, Kollmuss, and Lazarus 2015)
and the issue at the core of this paper, the 
use of non-additional Article 6 activities to 
achieve NDCs.
• The dynamic challenge refers to the in-
crease of ambition over time. Art. 4.3 states 
that “[e]ach Party’s successive nationally de-
termined contribution will represent a pro-
gression beyond the Party’s then current 
nationally determined contribution and re-
flect its highest possible ambition,...” (UN-
FCCC 2016a, Art. 4.3). The utilization of Arti-
cle 6 mechanisms must not set incentives
for countries to limit the level of ambition of 
subsequent NDCs as to maximize the po-
tential to sell and export ITMOs. 
2.3 Baselines 
A baseline is a reference scenario against which 
additionality is assessed and which also serves 
as a benchmark to determine emission reduc-
tions achieved in market-based instruments of 
the “baseline-and-crediting” type (see box be-
low). The concept of baselines is instrumental 
to assessing additionality. As Gillenwater puts it: 
“additionality is the process of determining 
whether a proposed activity is better than a 
specified baseline” (Gillenwater 2012, 3).  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, non-Annex I coun-
tries did not have any mitigation obligations.
Reference scenarios for the CDM therefore only 
had to take into account existing policies.3 Un-
der the Paris Agreement, all signatories are 
obliged to develop NDCs and to increase the 
level of ambition over time (Art. 4.3) Determin-
ing the baseline would arguably have to require 
some foresight into how national mitigation 
objectives and the policies implemented to
achieve those objectives might develop. 
Note that in order to calculate emission reduc-
tions in a crediting scheme, also a quantified 
version of a baseline is required (for additionali-
ty assessment a qualitative scenario would be 
sufficient in most if not all cases). The crediting
baseline does not necessary align perfectly with 
the reference scenario against which addition-
ality is assessed. One way to hedge environ-
mental integrity risks would be to combine rela-
tively lenient additionality baselines with more 
stringent crediting baselines. This would lower 
the entry barriers because demonstrating addi-
tionality becomes more feasible, yet it would
reduce the amount of credits issued for each 
project.
 
3In 2005 the CDM Executive Board determined that pro-
ject developers do not have to take into account new 
policies that would reduce emissions (E- policies) (CDM
Executive Board 2005). For a more detailed discussion 
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3 Additional to What?
Determining the “Extra”
One of the great challenges for additionality 
within the legal architecture of the Paris 
Agreement is to determine the relationship be-
tween a prospective policy intervention that is 
supposed to incentivize additional mitigation 
activities and the status quo of national climate 
policies corresponding to the Paris Agreement.
In other words, it is difficult to determine what 
and where any “extra” good can be done.
This was much more easy in the world of the 
Kyoto Protocol in which there were basically a 
black and white perspective: developing coun-
tries (not listed in Annex I of the convention) 
did not have any legal obligations to reduce or 
limit GHG emissions. On the level of the policy 
intervention, it was clear that the incentive pro-
vided by the CDM was to be considered, there 
was no competing or complementary incentive 
in place from the international level.
Hence the question of additionality could be 
considered on the level of existing technologies 
and policies in the country and did not (or only 
to a limited extent) have to take into account 
dynamic perspectives. Put simply, every activity 
that transcended the national state of technol-
ogy and policy was in principle additional.
In contrast to that, developed countries (listed 
in Annex I) did have formal obligations to re-
duce their emissions and these obligations ex-
tended to the full “Kyoto basket” of all major 
GHGs and covered all sectors. That meant that
from an international perspective, there was no 
room for “extra” activities. Hence, it was left to 
the discretion of host countries of mitigation 
projects to determine whether or not they were 
considered additional. Any mitigation out-
comes that were transferred had to be deduct-
ed from the country’s carbon budget deter-
mined by its quantified limitation and reduction 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. This was 
the basic functioning of Joint Implementation.
With the Paris Agreement, there are now many 
more shades of grey. This section sets out to 
explore these shades in more detail. First of all, 
the Paris Agreement does not differentiate 
among countries any more with respect to the 
type and legal character of obligations. Its Arti-
cle 4 requires all countries alike to “prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive nation-
ally determined contributions that it intends to 
achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitiga-
tion measures, with the aim of achieving the 
objectives of such contributions“ (UNFCCC 
2016a, Art. 4.2).
A first round of such (intended) nationally de-
termined contributions was already prepared in 
the run-up to the Paris conference. However, 
negotiations on a common format and infor-
mation requirements for those (i)NDCs had 
failed in Lima, one year ahead of COP21 in Paris 
(Ott et al. 2014). Consequently, the (i)NDCs 
submitted displayed a great diversity in terms 
of the types of targets, time frames, reference 
years and essentially every aspect of them
(Kreibich and Obergassel 2016).
Moreover, the Paris Agreement does not im-
pose any legal obligations to actually achieve 
the self-imposed goals (Bodansky 2016; Ober-
thür and Bodle 2016; Obergassel et al. 2015). At 
least for developed countries, this is a step 
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gal compulsion of commitments (Depledge 
2016).
The disparate structure and the lack of clarity 
and comparability of NDCs makes for a difficult 
assessment of what is “extra” and what is not.
This is true both for the potential demand as 
well as for the supply of ITMOs. A range of 
countries have indicated in their (i)NDCs that 
they are intending to rely on international car-
bon trading in order to attain their mitigation 
pledges (Obergassel and Gornik 2015; IETA 
2017). For some of these countries it remains 
unclear what part of their commitment is to be 
achieved domestically and what part is sup-
posed to be “imported” by supporting mitiga-
tion action elsewhere. Other countries make a 
more clear distinction. Norway, for example, has 
and indicated a fixed contribution of reducing 
GHG emissions 40% below 1990 levels. This
shall be achieved through collective delivery 
with the European Union. However, Norway al-
so specifies that it will adopt a binding carbon 
neutrality goal for 2030 that is to be attained by 
“achieving emission reductions abroad equiva-
lent to Norwegian emissions in 2030” (Govern-
ment of Norway 2015, 5).
The issue is even more true for the potential 
supply side for ITMOs. The most basic of view-
points would be to take Art. 4.3 literally that 
states that NDCs will “reflect [a Party’s] highest 
possible ambition...“ (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4.3). 
In this case, there simply would not be anything 
“extra” left. However, for two reasons this is not 
a viable position: firstly, Article 4.3 continues to 
read “reflecting its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in
the light of different national circumstances“ 
(UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 4.3). In particular the “re-
spective capabilities” is of interest here as the 
capabilities could be improved through inter-
national market-based cooperative climate ac-
tion.
Secondly, the reality of the first round of NDCs 
falls far short of the ambition set out in Art. 4.3. 
In the decisions adopting the Paris Agreement,
Parties explicitly “noted with concern” that the 
collective effort expressed in the (i)NDCs falls
far short of what is necessary to limit global
warming to well below 2°C (UNFCCC 2016b, pa-
ra. 17, see also 2016c; Fawcett et al. 2015).
What is more, there is in many countries also a 
mismatch between the commitments made in 
terms of mitigation goals and the policies and 
measures in place (or intended to be imple-
mented) to meet the same goals (Climate 
Action Tracker 2017).
Also, much like at the demand side, several 
countries have indicated that mitigation com-
mitments under their respective NDCs are con-
tingent on financial and/or technological sup-
port. In some countries, this support is explicitly
expected to be generated and channelled 
through market based cooperative climate ac-
tion (Obergassel and Gornik 2015). Not in all 
cases it is indicated what part of the NDC is
supposed to be achieved unconditionally and 
which part may be contingent on financial
flows from developed countries.
This brings us to another dimension to be con-
sidered: how do the financial flows associated 
with ITMO sales relate to flows of international 
climate finance according to Article 9 of the Par-
is Agreement (see also Spalding-Fecher et al. 
2017) and the goal of mobilizing at least USD 
100 billion annually as of 2020? Should the 
availability of international climate finance be 
the baseline against which additionality is as-
sessed? What if a country has specified a condi-
tional mitigation target in its NDC that is con-
tingent on the availability of international 
climate finance, the required support is not 
granted and consequently the country cannot 
(fully) realize its conditional target? If that coun-
try fills the funding gap by selling ITMOs, 
should these ITMOs be considered additional?
There is yet another way in which one could 
conceptualize the “extra”: the scope of NDCs 
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Figure 1: Illustration of various potential baselines for additionality assessment. Source: Wuppertal Institute
of countries have expressed their mitigation 
pledges encompassing all sectors and all
greenhouse gases. Many countries only include 
selected sectors in their respective targets and 
exclude others. Some countries don’t even have 
quantitative targets but have committed to in-
troduce certain policies and measures. Uganda,
for example, has no formal GHG target (or any 
other target-metric for that matter), but has 
committed to specific actions in the power sec-
tor, forestry and wetlands. In the power sector, 
the construction of enabling infrastructure for 
electricity sector development, including power 
lines, substations and transmission facilities was 
pledged with a view to achieve a total of at 
least 3,200 Mega Watts (Minstry of Water and 
Environment of the Republic of Uganda 2015).
Any proposed activity that is not part of the 
specific actions pledged in the NDC would con-
stitute an “extra”, one could argue.
The various options how to conceptualize the 
different possible baselines towards which ad-
ditionality could be assessed under the Paris 
Agreement are illustrated in figure 1 above.  
The most stringent baseline against which to 
assess additionality is the “highest possible lev-
el of ambition”. It would essentially denote that 
there is nothing that is additional. However, this 
is neither realistic nor practical.  
On the other side of the spectrum, one theoret-
ical option for a baseline against which to as-
sess additionality simply is a projection of busi-
ness as usual development. This, however,
would not reflect the legal responsibilities that 
every country has assumed under the Paris 
Agreement, namely to develop and maintain 
NDCs and to implement policies to achieve 
them.  
There are various ways in which NDCs could be 
considered as baselines for additionality.
Should the unconditional4 target (if specified) 
be the baseline? Should it be the conditional
target? This latter option would at least allow to 
avoid one area of potential conflict, namely that 
sales of ITMOs (that may be used to offset do-
mestic mitigation elsewhere) crowds out other 
forms of climate finance that could not be used 
for offsetting and hence lead to lower overall
 
4Note that there is no universally accepted definition of 
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emissions. Last but not least, one could consid-
er the actual policies and measures implement-
ed in the context of the NDC as the baseline.
However, if an implementation gap exists in the 
potential host country, i.e. the country is unlike-
ly to meet its NDC target with current policies, 
the transfer of ITMOs could result not in an in-
crease of ambition but the opposite, particular-
ly if the ITMOs are used for offsetting purposes.5 
Using NDCs as a baseline for additionality as-
sessment is not only problematic for the tech-
nical reasons outlined above, but also because 
the NDCs themselves may be inadequate. To 
ensure that Article 6 strictly contributes to an 
increase of the level of ambition, even if ITMOs 
are used to (partially) offset domestic climate 
action in the buyer country, the most adequate 
baseline would be an emissions pathway that is
compatible with the long-term goal of the Paris 
Agreement, to limit global warming to well be-
low 2 °C.  
While this may be theoretically compelling, it is 
methodologically challenging. Who is to de-
termine what a 2 °C pathway could or should 
look like? It is also politically challenging, be-
cause NDCs are nationally determined. It is
hardly plausible that Parties would accept an 
independent assessment, a top-down imposed 
benchmark that goes beyond what they have 
determined for themselves as a sovereign na-
tion. What is more, a 2 °C pathway would most 
likely be so aggressive and ambitious, that 
there is virtually no mitigation potential left 
that could be transferred to another country.
Considering the transformative ambition of the 
Paris Agreement, it is ultimately necessary that 
with the support of Article 6, the host country 
of a proposed activity would have to end up on 
 
5 The long-term low greenhouse gas emission develop-
ment strategies that Parties are invited to prepare in ac-
cordance with Art. 4.19 of the Paris Agreement could be 
another reference point. However, to date only a hand-
ful of countries have developed und published such 
long-term strategies. 
a transformative pathway well below 2 °C 
pathway. If one cannot expect Article 6 to in-
crease the ambition even beyond the 1.5/2 °C 
threshold, at least it should serve as a leg-up to 
a transformational development pathway. In 
essence this would mean to substitute the addi-
tionality criterion with a transformational
change criterion. The questions implied in addi-
tionality are: What is? And how does the pro-
posed activity go beyond the status quo? 
Whereas the questions to ask to assess trans-
formational change are: What ought to be? And 
how can the project get us there? 
However, operationalizing the transformational 
change criterion for Article 6 would most prob-
ably be no less challenging. The issue of “trans-
formational impact” has been discussed at 
some length regarding public climate finance 
(Mersmann and Wehnert 2015). The NAMA Fa-
cility has the ambition to finance only NAMAs 
with transformational impact. Similarly, the 
Green Climate Fund has the objective to pro-
mote a “paradigm shift”. However, the criteria 
adopted by the NAMA Facility and the GCF to
operationalize this ambition have so far been 
rather vague (cf. Hermwille, Obergassel, and
Arens 2016). Arguably, the reason is that they 
have tried to define general criteria that can 
apply to all sectors. A meaningful definition of 
transformational impact is likely only possible 
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4 Additional by What Means
– Confounded Causalities
Given the wide range of possible forms market-
based cooperation under Article 6 could take,
there is no single approach to additionality and 
additionality demonstration that can accom-
modate all imaginable cases. The subsequent 
section starts out with presenting a range of 
potential types of cooperation and discusses 
what can be considered cause and what effect 
for the respective types. Only then do we turn 
to assessing the causal relationship between 
both ends of the presumptive chain.
4.1 Start and Endpoint of  
the Causal Chain 
As stated in the introduction, “additionality is
about assessing causation. It is about deciding 
if a proposed activity is being caused to happen 
by a policy intervention” (Gillenwater 2012, 3). 
In order to resolve this question, we first need 
to define what the “policy intervention” is and 
what kind of “proposed activities” we are fore-
seeing that would generate the very mitigation 
outcomes that are supposed to be traded in-
ternationally. That is, before assessing a causal 
chain we need to define the start and the end-
point of that presumptive causal chain.
At the most general level, one could argue that 
Article 6 itself can be considered a policy inter-
vention. After all, the “prototype” for a market-
based mitigation mechanism and the harbinger 
of additionality as a concept, the CDM, was al-
ways considered as such a policy intervention.  
Considering Article 6 as a policy intervention 
would correspond to the CDM which, likewise,
was established as a single paragraph, Article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997).
However, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement dif-
fers from the CDM and Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol in that it is more of a container of po-
tentially a series of mechanisms or instruments 
to cooperate internationally. There is Article 6.2 
that establishes so-called “cooperative ap-
proaches” which enables member states to col-
laborate directly without a formal set of modali-
ties and procedures, but Parties “shall apply 
robust accounting [...] consistent with guidance 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties serv-
ing as the meeting of the Parties to this Agree-
ment [CMA]” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 6.2).
In contrast to that, Article 6.4 establishes a new 
mechanism “to contribute to the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and support sustain-
able development” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 6.4).
This mechanism will be supervised internation-
ally and be subject to mandatory modalities 
and procedures to be adopted by the CMA.
Last but not least, Article 6.8 refers to “non-
market approaches” that may assist countries in 
implementing their NDCs. While there is not 
much common ground on how such non-
market approaches may look like, it is pretty 
clear that they are not going to produce any 
transferable mitigation outcomes  
Given this wide range of potential policy inter-
ventions it does not seem to be particularly 
practical to consider Article 6 as THE policy in-
tervention. Asking whether or not the existence 
of Art. 6 has or has not caused a particular miti-
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In order to be able to ask the causality question 
it is necessary to be able to describe sufficiently 
accurately the policy intervention that is sup-
posed to have caused a mitigation outcome.
Given that in the international realm it is very 
unlikely that policy intervention of the regula-
tive type are imposed by one country on an-
other, it is safe to say that a policy intervention 
to be considered for Article 6 is almost always 
associated with a transfer of resources. Either it 
is a direct payment or it is the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding that contrac-
tually fixes payments on the condition of cer-
tain (mitigation) results or conducts (e.g. im-
plementation of certain policies and measures).
As stated above, with the CDM, the policy inter-
vention was the mechanism itself that pre-
scribed a procedure that if followed through 
would result in the issuance of certified emis-
sion reductions (CERs) which when sold would 
yield an uncertain yet significant stream of rev-
enues for the project proponent.
In the following section, we are trying to antici-
pate a range of different type of activities that 
may be used under Article 6.2 and 6.4. For each 
of them, we discuss what would constitute the 
“policy intervention” and what the “proposed 
activity” that is supposed to be caused by the 
former. For lack of better terminology we have 
tried to differentiate project-based, program-
matic, sectoral and policy-based approaches.
However, this categorization admittedly is not 
always clear-cut, yet we think it helps to guide 
through an otherwise impenetrable thicket of 
different and partially overlapping design con-
cepts. 
Project-based crediting mechanism 
International cooperation under the Paris 
Agreement could revert to a project-based 
mechanism similar to the CDM and JI. In this
case, the identification of policy intervention 
and proposed activities is straightforward: 
much like the CDM, the establishment of the 
mechanism itself, as long as its procedures 
guarantee with reasonable confidence a stream
of revenue to the project proponent, would be 
the policy intervention and each project is a 
“proposed activity”. While in this case it may be
relatively easy to identify the starting and end 
points, it does not necessarily make it very easy 
to establish causality between the two. The very 
challenges summarized in section 3 apply here 
as well.
Programmatic approaches 
The programmatic approach, also known as 
Programmes of Activities under CDM/JI, bun-
dles a range of similar, usually smaller scale pro-
jects into one programme. For the program-
matic approach, there are basically two ways to 
conceptualize the causal chain that leads to 
mitigation outcomes.
(1) the programme itself could be the policy in-
tervention. For example, a country A could co-
operate with country B in setting up a large 
programme for energy efficient residential 
building renovation that is co-financed (and po-
tentially supported through technology trans-
fer) by country B. Such a form of cooperation 
could be one incarnation of a cooperative ap-
proach under Art. 6.2. The proposed activities in
this scenario would be the refurbishment of 
each individual building (or building complex 
for that matter). Assessing additionality for this
case would first have to address the question of 
how the programme itself relates to the host 
countries NDC and other (un)conditional poli-
cies and measures implemented to attain the 
NDC. And second, it would require to assess 
whether each refurbishment project (proposed 
activity) is additional in the sense that it would 
not have happened without the support of the 
programme.
(2) the programme itself is the proposed activi-
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Figure 2: Schematic illustration of a sectoral crediting mechanism. Source: modified based on Schneider and Cames (2009)
anism. This mirrors the CDM’s PoA modality. In 
this case, the question of additionality would 
assess whether or not the programme itself is
something “extra”. Each activity (or component 
project activity – CPA – under the CDM) does 
not have to demonstrate additionality but 
serves to determine and verify the mitigation 
outcomes.
Sectoral Approaches 
With sectoral approaches, there are again at 
least two ways of conceptualizing causality be-
tween a policy intervention and a proposed ac-
tivity. One way a sectoral approach could look 
like was essentially established in form of the 
standardized baselines (SB) framework of the 
CDM. Under this framework, a scenario can be
developed for an entire sector following a 
standardized approach (BMUB 2015; Hermwille, 
Arens, and Burian 2013). This scenario deter-
mines the crediting baseline and can also be 
used to pre-determine a list of technologies 
that can forego additionality demonstration at 
the level of individual project or at least have a 
streamlined additionality assessment. In this
case, the sectoral standardized baseline could 
not be considered a policy intervention, it
would require an overarching mechanism of 
some sort. The proposed activity would be any 
mitigation activity that applies the SB frame-
work.
Another form of a sectoral approach is so-called 
sectoral crediting (Sterk et al. 2015; Schneider 
and Cames 2009). This concept, already being 
discussed for more than a decade, could in
principle also be applied under Art. 6. Sectoral
Crediting has been proposed in various forms,
but under given circumstances probably the 
most plausible application is a bilateral applica-
tion of the concept as “cooperative approach” 
under Art. 6.2 and without formal international
oversight. This is what we consider in the sub-
sequent analysis.
Under such a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism, the 
host country would determine a target or a 
“crediting baseline”, for an entire sector or sub-
sector (e.g. the power sector) reflecting the host 
countries’ own effort and possibly also efforts 
supported by public climate finance. Under Ar-
ticle 6, this crediting baseline would have to re-
flect the host country’s NDC. If actual emissions 
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baseline, the government would receive trada-
ble emission reduction credits according to the 
difference between crediting baseline and ac-
tual emissions as assessed retroactively (blue 
area). 
However, establishing such a scheme can hard-
ly be seen as a policy intervention, as it would 
not provide an immediate incentive to any pri-
vate entity, but only to governments who 
would be first-order responsible for the reduc-
tion of emissions. The actual incentive would 
have to come up with more concrete policy in-
terventions. The host country government 
could draw on a broad range of instruments,
including carbon taxation, tax incentives for 
low-emission energy provision, renewable en-
ergy feed-in tariffs or portfolio standards, or 
other options.
Essentially in this case, additionality is not as-
sessed independently based on objective pa-
rameters, but it is defined in the act of agreeing 
the crediting baseline between host country 
and investor country. By setting the crediting 
baseline, the two parties agree politically that 
everything beyond that baseline constitutes 
additional mitigation outcomes. Hence, there is
no need to assess ex-ante the additionality of 
individual projects, programmes or policies the 
host country may implement to reduce emis-
sions below the agreed baseline. This is substi-
tuted by ex-post verification of the emissions. In
a sense, the risk of non-additional projects is
transferred from an environmental risk faced by 
the global atmosphere to a financial risk faced 
by the host country of the proposed sectoral
crediting scheme.
The challenge with this approach is that it may 
be prone to a “coalition of the unambitious”. As 
stated above, additionality is basically defined 
in the agreed determination of the crediting 
baseline. However, if both parties involved have 
not much interest in ambitious climate action,
the host country could propose a very unambi-
tious crediting baseline that is not substantially
below BAU and the investor country could 
happily agree because this would likely pro-
duce a substantial amount of low-cost ITMOs.
The two countries could use this mechanism to 
mask their lack of mitigation ambition. In the 
absence of formal obligations under interna-
tional law, public scrutiny is the only means 
that can help to hold policy makers accounta-
ble and to discipline them to implement their 
NDCs. Such “coalitions of the unambitious” 
could severely undermine such public scrutiny.
Policy-based approaches 
The range of possible incarnations of policy-
based incarnations of cooperative approaches 
or mechanism(s) under Article 6 is potentially
extremely diverse. In the subsequent section,
we will discuss a list of illustrative examples. 
This list certainly should not be considered ex-
haustive nor exclusive.
One example for a policy-based cooperative 
approach would be financial support for a feed-
in tariff in one country provided by another 
country and a subsequent transfer of mitigation 
outcomes resulting from the increased de-
ployment of renewable energy in the host 
country. With feed-in tariffs (FIT), for each MWh
of renewable energy fed into the grid, either a 
guaranteed fixed remuneration (fixed payment 
FIT) or a price premium on whole-sale prices 
(premium payment FIT) is being disbursed. In-
ternational cooperation could occur if country 
A agrees to contribute a share of premi-
um/fixed payment per MWh renewable energy 
produced in country B.
For the matter of determining additionality, the 
policy intervention would be increase of the 
tariff or the establishment of the FIT if there was 
no such policy in place before. In the latter case,
all RE projects that benefit from the FIT can be 
considered as proposed activities. In the former 
case, this is much more challenging. It is virtual-
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would also have been built at a lower tariff rate 
and which investments have become viable 
due to the increased FIT rate (Obergassel et al.
forthcoming). It is therefore impossible to de-
termine the exact “proposed activity” which 
may or may not have been caused by the top-
up of the FIT. Additionality determination 
would thus have to revert to an analysis of sys-
temic causation (Lakoff 2014), e.g. by applying 
statistical models.  
Apart from the additionality of individual RE in-
stallations, it would also be necessary to assess 
whether or not the increase/establishment of 
the FIT is additional. If the host country has 
formulated a GHG-related target and/or a RE 
target in its NDC, it will be challenging to assess 
whether and to what extent the international 
cooperation goes beyond those commitments.
Another policy-based approach that is being 
considered as a potential candidate for interna-
tional cooperation under Article 6 is the linking 
of existing domestic or regional emissions trad-
ing schemes (ETS). However, if these ETS are al-
ready pre-existing, just allowing trade between 
the two systems hardly constitutes a “policy in-
tervention” in the sense that it will trigger addi-
tional mitigation efforts. As long as the emis-
sions caps of the two ETS are not tightened 
further, the linking of the two systems will 
merely shift where the emissions occur.6 More
emission reductions will be realized where mit-
igation potentials can be realized relatively
cheaper.
In this case, additionality probably is not a par-
ticularly suited concept to safeguard environ-
mental integrity. Instead, environmental integ-
rity critically hinges on the stringency of the 
emissions cap in the two ETS to be linked to-
 
6 The conditions under which pre-existing ETS can or 
should be linked are subject of ongoing research. 
Whether or not two linked-up ETS lead to a robust inter-
national carbon markets depends inter alia on the com-
patibility of the design features of the two systems (for a 
detailed analysis see Tänzler et al. forthcoming). 
gether. If one of the systems has a cap that is
not binding in that it is so generous that even 
under BAU development, there will be no scar-
city of allowances. This so-called “hot air” could 
be transferred from one system to the other 
(Kollmuss, Schneider, and Zhezherin 2015),
push down allowances prices in the more strin-
gent ETS and hence reduce incentives for do-
mestic mitigation action. If emission allowances 
can be carried over from one crediting period 
to another (banking) this could even under-
mine the ambition of future NDCs (Raeschke-
Kessler 2017).
4.2 Assessing Causal Chains
Once we have established the start and the end 
of a presumptive causal chain, we can turn to 
an assessment of the causal relationship be-
tween the two.  
A cause "is the sum total of the conditions posi-
tive and negative taken together ... which being 
realized, the consequent invariably follows." 
(Mill cited in Davidson 1967, 692). However, 
when assessing additionality it is impractical to
take into account “the sum total” of potentially
infinite necessary conditions, even the most cir-
cumstantial ones. 7  Instead, assessing addi-
tionality requires to identify unmet neces-
sary conditions which by means of the 
respective policy intervention will be re-
solved. This requires to assess (1) whether the 
 
7 Necessary conditions imply that a proposition can only 
be true if the respective condition is met: if A is not true 
then B cannot be true. Whether or not we consider the 
meeting of such conditions as a cause depends how sa-
lient and substantial such conditions are. For example, in 
order for two countries to cooperate under Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement requires not only the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement as a necessary condition, but also 
the mere existence of nation states. Following the ge-
neric definition of “cause” cited above, these two neces-
sary conditions ought to be taken into account in as-
sessing causation. Yet, such circumstantial conditions 
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respective policy intervention in principle ad-
dresses the unmet condition and (2) whether it
is fit to resolve the deficit. 
At the bottom of this is a fundamental dilemma.
The first component of this dilemma is to iden-
tify unmet conditions or rather decide at which 
point a condition will be met. The larger the 
deficit, the more easy it is to identify with confi-
dence an unmet condition. However, the larger 
the deficit, the more powerful a policy interven-
tion must be to be able to make a significant 
contribution to remedying the same deficit.
The same is true vice-versa: in cases where a 
condition is just not met, it is fairly easy to 
demonstrate that the policy intervention can 
actually contribute to cross the threshold. How-
ever, given that there is typically no clearly de-
fined threshold, it may be challenging to ascer-
tain to determine whether the condition is
actually met or unmet in the first place.  
In practice, typically, a number of different 
types of conditions are considered (Gillenwater 
2012; World Bank 2016; Schneider et al. 2017).
There are, of course, financial conditions. Miti-
gation activities may not be implemented un-
der business-as-usual conditions if they are not 
economically viable or if alternative technolo-
gies are more economically attractive than the 
most climate-friendly option. Another related 
issue may be restricted access to financial capi-
tal (World Bank 2016).
Assessing financial additionality was one of the 
core features of the CDM’s additionality tool.
The tool requires to demonstrate that a pro-
posed project is not economically viable (by 
way of cost analysis) or that it is less attractive 
than alternative options (by way of investment 
comparison analysis or benchmark analysis) 
(CDM Executive Board 2012; see also Schneider 
et al. 2017).
The second part of determining causation,
namely to check whether the policy interven-
tion (CDM revenues) were actually fit to pass 
the threshold and make the project viable is not 
required as it was deemed too challenging giv-
en the inherent uncertainty about the actual
revenues that can be realized (uncertainty 
about quantity of certified emission reductions 
and most importantly uncertainty about CER 
prices).
Instead, it is assumed that the stream of reve-
nue is significant enough to in principle address 
the issue. However, with CER prices crashing to 
near zero, this assumption is now more and 
more called into question (see for example 
Schneider 2009; Cames et al. 2016; Obergassel 
et al. forthcoming).
Alongside financial issues, it is often technolog-
ical barriers that are considered as unmet con-
ditions: for example, lack of availability of low-
carbon technologies, lack of awareness, or lack 
of knowledge about their respective costs and 
benefits.
One approach to demonstrate such barriers is 
the so-called common practice test which as-
sess the prevalence or uptake of a certain tech-
nology or process. When that technolo-
gy/process is not (or not widely) available, it can 
be presumed that it is additional (World Bank 
2016). In this case, it is challenging to argue 
how the support of the policy intervention ac-
tually contributes to removing the barrier, at 
least on the level of an individual project. If a 
larger (sectoral) policy is under consideration 
for Article 6, this may be more feasible since 
one could argue that the establishment of that 
policy creates a ‘critical mass’ to attract special-
ized investors or contractors to deploy the 
technology in the country. 
Another barrier (i.e. unmet necessary condition) 
concerns split incentives. A proposed activity 
may be economically viable in and of itself, but 
the benefits (e.g. savings through improved en-
ergy efficiency) are not earned by the same ac-
tors that bear the costs for implementing the 
project. The famous landlord-tenant dilemma is
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for example, that the revenues from selling 
credits can be used to create an incentive to 
those actors who would otherwise not benefit 
from the implementation of the project.
All of the aforementioned approaches attempt 
to identify barriers (unmet necessary condi-
tions) at the status quo, at business as usual.
However, as discussed above, business as usual 
should no longer be considered as a baseline 
against which to assess additionality. This com-
plicates things further.
Another challenge but also an opportunity is
the wide range of different forms of coopera-
tion that may emerge under Article 6. As the 
various forms may have very different start and 
endpoints for which to consider causal relation-
ships, it will most likely be necessary to develop 
tailor-made additionality demonstration tools.
In some cases, it may be reasonable to identify 
and assess unmet conditions at the aggregate 
level and with standardized approaches. In oth-
er cases it may be more appropriate to make 
that judgement at the level of the individual ac-
tivity. 
At least in theory also a combination of ap-
proaches would be possible. This could be 
done, for example, by identifying unmet condi-
tions at the generic sectoral level but to assess 
whether the policy intervention is fit to over-
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5Governance Aspects of 
Additionality
One may expect that, different from the CDM,
additionality demonstration under Article 6 will 
be a very political exercise as it will need to take 
into account countries’ NDCs and national poli-
cies. One may therefore wonder to what extent 
international governance will actually be possi-
ble as it might quickly collide with the host 
country’s national sovereignty. If additionality 
demonstration is tied to the host country’s NDC
but the NDC is weak or national policies are not 
sufficient to achieve the NDC, will it be possible 
for international governance to intervene in or-
der to prevent the transfer of “hot air” 
(Schneider et al. 2017)? The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that formal international
governance is not even foreseen for coopera-
tive approaches under Article 6.2.
The following will discuss what additionality 
demonstration could look like for each of the 
activity types outlined in section 4 and will then 
discuss the scope for international governance.
5.1 Project-based and 
Programmatic Crediting 
Mechanisms 
At first glance, it seems that project-based co-
operation under Article 6 could copy and paste 
the CDM’s additionality tool, with one im-
portant change: the demonstration of addition-
ality should take into account the host coun-
try’s NDC and national policies. This would 
mean that activities required by national regu-
lations or supported by sufficient national fund-
ing schemes could not be considered addition-
al.
Under Article 6.4, international governance 
could adopt the tool, assess the tool’s applica-
tion to proposed activities and take the final
decision whether the activity is additional or 
not. Under Article 6.2, the role of the UNFCCC 
would probably at best be limited to adoption 
of the tool and prescribing that all activities 
need to apply the tool, but its application and 
approval of activities would probably be done 
by the Parties involved.
In an ideal world, where NDCs are ambitious 
and national policies are in line with that ambi-
tion, there would be no problem for interna-
tional governance. Problems arise if NDCs are 
weak or national policies are not sufficient to 
actually achieve the NDC. In such a case, pro-
posed activities could be additional to what the 
country IS doing but not additional to what the 
country SHOULD be doing.
However, international governance could never 
make such a judgement. Such a judgement 
could conceivably only be made by the pro-
spective buyers of ITMOs; they could inform the 
host country that they will not be willing to
provide funding for activities that are not ambi-
tious. Nonetheless, there would be a risk of low-
ambition coalitions as discussed above.
To some extent, use of objective values such as 
Best-Available-Technology (BAT) benchmarks 
could solve these problems. International gov-
ernance could develop methodologies for es-
tablishing BAT values and assess application of 
the methodologies. However, this approach is
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dustrial sectors where technologies are applied 
under comparable circumstances that result in
comparable specific emission intensities. 
5.2 Sectoral Approaches 
As outlined in the previous section, in the case 
of sectoral approaches, additionality is deter-
mined not at the level of individual activities 
but by the establishment of the crediting base-
line. In theory, the sectoral crediting baseline 
could be set at the level of the unconditional
NDC. In practice, this will be difficult as most 
NDCs do not have a sectoral breakdown. The 
host country would first have to establish a tar-
get for the sector that is to be the subject of the 
sectoral cooperation.
Again, the problem arises who would then 
judge whether the sectoral target is ambitious.
Again, only the buyers of the ITMOs could con-
ceivably make such a judgement. International
governance could at best provide methodolo-
gies for how to establish sectoral baselines and 
review whether the application of the method-
ologies is correct in a technical sense. 
5.3 Policy-based Approaches 
The question of the additionality of national
policies has at least two sub-questions: 
• Is the policy necessary to achieve additional 
mitigation? 
• Does the policy create a net cost for the 
country? 
Michaelowa (forthcoming) suggests that emis-
sion pricing instruments and financial support 
schemes tend to be additional as they impose a 
clearly visible cost on the economy and/or the 
host country government. By contrast, regula-
tions are not so clear-cut as they often address 
mitigation options that would be profitable but 
are nonetheless not undertaken due to split in-
centives or other barriers. He suggests various 
methodologies to assess the additionality of 
each type of instrument.
Under Article 6.4, international governance 
could adopt such methodologies, assess their 
application to proposed activities and take the 
final decision whether the activity is additional
or not. Under Article 6.2, the role of the UNFCCC 
would probably at best be limited to adoption 
of the methodologies and prescribing that all
activities need to apply them, but their applica-
tion and approval of activities would probably 
be done by the Parties involved. Again, the key 
difficulty is that the proposed activity may be 
additional in the host country context only be-
cause the country’s own efforts are not ambi-
tious, but international governance could not 
make such a judgement.
5.4 Summary on Potential Roles 
of International Governance
for Different Types of 
Activities 
The above discussion has shown that there is
some role for international governance under 
Article 6, in particular: 
• Step 1: Developing tools and methodolo-
gies for the demonstration of additionality 
for different types of activities;
• Step 2: Reviewing whether the 
tools/methodologies have been correctly
applied to the proposed activities. 
• Step 3: In the case of projects, programmes 
and policies international governance un-
der Article 6.4 could conceivably also have 
the role of approving proposed activities.
Under Article 6.2, the role of the UNFCCC 
could at best extended to step 2. Approval
of sectoral approaches could probably not 
be the subject of international governance 
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additionality is directly tied to the host 
country’s level of ambition.
The level of ambition is the crux for all types of 
activities. Even if a proposed activity is addi-
tional to the current level of ambi-
tion/implementation, it may still be short of
what would be required from the country if its 
fair share was taken as a benchmark. But it 
seems highly unlikely that any form of interna-
tional governance will have a mandate to make 
such judgements. The only measure of contain-
ing this risk that we currently see is to rely on 
the responsibility of potential buyers of ITMOs.  
5.5 Hedging Risks of Low-
Ambition Coalitions  
Theoretically, the risk generating new “hot air” 
could be mitigated by tying eligibility to partic-
ipate in Article 6 to the level of ambition of the 
NDC. However, the political viability of this ap-
proach is probably low. Apart from the difficulty 
of judging the level of ambition as such, there 
also is the problem of judging the appropriate-
ness of assumptions used to project business as 
usual, such as population and economic
growth.
Brazil has proposed that eligibility to generate
and transfer ITMOs under Article 6.2 should be 
limited to absolute emission reductions. Such 
an approach would not necessarily lead to am-
bitious action, but it would indeed eliminate a 
huge part of the environmental integrity risk.
The downside would be that it would de facto 
exclude most developing countries from partic-
ipation. One may consider that the lack of in-
ternational governance under Article 6.2 is a 
huge privilege that should indeed be limited to 
countries who are at least not increasing their 
emissions further. The political viability of this 
approach remains to be seen. 
Otherwise, the only viable way to prevent coali-
tions of the unambitious seems to be transpar-
ency, naming and shaming. Discussions should 
explore what technical provisions could be use-
ful to facilitate such transparency. Two candi-
dates are:
• Parties using Article 6 could be required to 
report how their use of Article 6 has helped 
them increase ambition as required by Arti-
cle 6.1. This reporting could be made sub-
ject of the international review under the 
PA’s transparency mechanism.
• Transfers of ITMOs could be limited to the 
partners that directly participate in the Arti-
cle 6 activity. That is, sales to intermediaries 
would be excluded. Such a provision would 
prevent the dilution of responsibility that 
would occur if the final user of the ITMO is 
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6 Summary and 
Conclusions
6.1 How to Establish the 
Baseline for Additionality? 
Additionality was considered a critical corner 
stone for environmental integrity in the Kyoto 
world. Its core function was to make sure that 
using flexible mechanisms did not lead to an
increase of overall global emissions. However, 
the architecture of the Paris Agreement is fun-
damentally different from the Kyoto Protocol.
The issue of environmental integrity that the 
additionality concept is meant to protect has to 
be addressed differently. This paper set out to 
explore the various core elements of additional-
ity and additionality assessment in the context 
of the Paris Agreement in order to lay the con-
ceptual foundations for the operationalization 
of additionality for application for market-
based cooperative climate action under Article 
6 of the Paris Agreement.
A first key step in this analysis was to determine 
the baseline against which additionality ought 
to be assessed. The transformational ambition 
of the Paris Agreement and the universal man-
date to develop and communicate increasingly 
more ambitious NDCs makes it clear that the 
status quo or business as usual can no longer 
serve as reference points for additionality as-
sessment, as it would risk locking in a vastly in-
sufficient level of ambition.
Ideally, any activity under Article 6 would build
on this and go beyond the respective host 
country’s NDC. However, in practice, this will be 
extremely challenging for a number of reasons:
• NDCs may be not ambitious enough and 
not in line with a transformational pathway 
towards well below 2 °C.
• Even if NDCs are ambitious, the actual im-
plementation may be insufficient.
• Many NDCs do not specify to what extent 
external support (financial and/or techno-
logical) is required. Whenever external fi-
nancial support is required, it is unclear 
whether this support could be provided 
through cooperative approaches or wheth-
er other forms of climate finance should be 
prioritized.
• Last but not least, additionality assessment 
requires a high level of (sector-specific) de-
tail which most often is not included in the 
NDCs themselves. 
6.2 How to Establish Causality 
and Unmet Conditions? 
Almost as important as establishing a baseline 
to which a proposed activity is supposed to be 
additional is to precisely specify what should be 
considered the cause and what is the effect. Af-
ter all, assessing additionality is a matter of es-
tablishing a causal relationship between some 
sort of policy intervention and proposed activi-
ties that actually deliver mitigation results. If 
you do not define the start and endpoint of the 
presumed causal chain, how can you determine 
a causal relationship?  
At the current state of negotiations, there is still 
a very high degree of uncertainty of how specif-
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is safe to assume that for the mechanism estab-
lished under Art. 6.4 at some point there will be 
a precise description of the mechanism as a pol-
icy intervention, this is not the case for coopera-
tive approaches under Art. 6.2.
In section 4.1 we have therefore sketched a 
range of different forms in which international
cooperation could be operationalized under 
Art. 6, ranging from project-based mechanisms
of the likes of CDM/JI to linking of national
and/or regional emissions trading efforts. Espe-
cially for the latter, it is extremely difficult to
identify a specific policy intervention and at 
least as difficult to single out the effect of that 
intervention. Consequently, assessing addition-
ality cannot be meaningfully applied for all po-
tential incarnations of Art. 6 cooperation. Also,
any guidelines for additionality demonstration 
need to take into account the details of the 
proposed form of cooperation. To put it meta-
phorically, establishing guidelines for addition-
ality demonstration without knowledge of the 
forms of cooperation is like designing a chicken 
shed without knowing what kind of birds will 
eventually hatch from the eggs before you.
Even if you have a clear understanding of what 
the start and endpoint of the presumed causal
chain is, it may still be challenging to actually 
establish a causal relationship between the two.
In practice, assessing additionality requires to 
identify unmet necessary conditions which by 
means of the respective policy intervention will 
be resolved. This requires to assess (1) whether 
the respective policy intervention in principle 
addresses the unmet condition and (2) whether 
it is fit to resolve the deficit. 
In the past, this has been addressed by focusing 
on a few types of barriers/unmet conditions.
Among the most prominent are financial issues.
In the CDM world, projects typically demon-
strated that proposed activities are not eco-
nomically viable and/or that more economically
attractive alternatives were available. It was 
then assumed that the revenues generated 
from CER sales would compensate these short-
comings.
Other barriers included the availability of 
and/or knowledge about technologies. While it
may be relatively easy to demonstrate that such 
barriers indeed constitute an unmet condition,
it is more challenging to argue how a policy in-
tervention can resolve that barrier. 
Another related challenge is that most of the 
established tools for additionality demonstra-
tion such as investment analysis and common 
practice tests implicitly recur on the status quo.
However, as explained above, the status quo 
should not be allowed as a baseline against 
which additionality is demonstrated. Under the 
CDM, it may have been sufficient that a certain 
technology is not yet common practice in a 
given host country. Under the Paris Agreement,
we need to further consider to what extent the 
technology ought to be common practice with 
the NDC adequately implemented, or even bet-
ter, on a pathway that is consistent with the 
well-below 2 °C target. 
6.3 Where to Get Information 
on Transformational 
Challenges? 
Our analysis highlights that assessing addition-
ality in the context of the Paris Agreement re-
quires a precise understanding of the transfor-
mational challenges of the specific sector for 
which an activity is planned. Unfortunately, it is
highly unlikely that this clarity can come from
the NDCs themselves. And, as the discussion in 
section 5 demonstrates, while there is some 
room for international governances, it is also 
highly unlikely that any form of international
governance could advance and specify an addi-
tionality baseline above and beyond the NDCs.
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So what other reference points may be there to 
gain a more specific picture of transformation
challenges? One potential starting point could 
be the long-term low greenhouse gas devel-
opment strategies that parties are invited to 
prepare in accordance with Art. 4.19 of the Paris 
Agreement. Ideally, such long-term strategies 
would lay out the respective national transfor-
mation pathway towards a 2/1.5 °C compatible 
economy and society. They would not only 
cover sectoral visions, but also spell out the bar-
riers and gaps that still need to be filled in order 
to embark on that pathway. However, to date 
only a handful of countries have presented 
such long-term strategies. 
Some of the other elements of the Paris Agree-
ment could also serve as reference points. One 
such example is the transparency mechanism
established in Art. 13 of the Paris Agreement.
Art. 13.11 and .12 stipulate that a technical ex-
pert review shall be conducted to consider the 
implementation of a countries NDC and “identi-
fy areas of improvement for the Party” (UNFCCC 
2016a, Art. 13.12).
Likewise, the so-called Global Stocktake pursu-
ant to Art. 14 of the Paris Agreement could 
serve as a point of reference. The Global Stock-
take is supposed to aggregate national data in
order “to assess the collective progress towards 
achieving the purpose of this Agreement and 
its long-term goals” (UNFCCC 2016a, Art. 14.1).
It is beyond the mandate of the Global Stock-
take to develop country-specific recommenda-
tions or even instructions. Still, the Global 
Stocktake is supposed to inform the develop-
ment of subsequent NDCs. If the Stocktake de-
veloped a sectoral perspective on transfor-
mation challenges as well as strategies and 
means to address those challenges, it could not 
only well serve this mandate but would also be 
particularly informative for assessing addition-
ality.
Given that the first round of technical expert 
reviews and the first global stocktake will only 
be completed by 2023, they cannot (yet) serve 
as reference points for additionality demonstra-
tion. However, it is worth keeping in mind when 
the detailed rulebook for both the transparency 
framework and the global stocktake is negoti-
ated in the upcoming UNFCCC meetings. 
From the existing toolbox, the concept of sec-
toral standardized baselines and best available 
technology (BAT) benchmarks could serve as a 
starting point to develop an understanding of 
the transformation challenges of the respective 
sectors. Yet, these tools would have to be 
adapted to fit the context of the Paris Agree-
ment and reflect its transformational ambition.
Alternatively, if it is not possible to come up 
with a robust baseline against which additional-
ity can be assessed, it may be worth slightly ad-
justing the question. Instead of demonstrating 
the additionality one could ask whether or not 
the utilization of Art. 6 serves as a leg-up to a
transformational, well below 2 °C-compatible 
pathway. Given the current deficits of NDCs and 
their implementation, Article 6 would make a 
strong contribution if it was used to jump-start 
the required transformation and help host 
countries to get onto a low carbon, climate re-
silient development pathway. Instead of asking 
whether international cooperation helps to do
more than the current (insufficient) level, one 
would ask whether international cooperation 
helps to do enough. Instead of additionality,
the decisive criterion would be whether the 
proposed cooperation provides a significant 
contribution to transformational change.
While this approach may sound appealing,
there are a number of questions that cannot be 
addressed in this Policy Paper and would re-
quire further research. Are there (objective) 
ways to assess the transformational impact of a 
proposed activity? To what extent can existing 
approaches such as Standardized Baselines and 
BAT benchmarks serve as a starting point for 
such an assessment, if adapted appropriately to 
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environmental integrity concerns be addressed 
when the transformational change criterion is 
applied? To what extent can short crediting pe-
riods and/or adjusted crediting baselines ad-
dress these concerns?
6.4 How to Govern for 
Additionality? 
Despite the political nature of determining ad-
ditionality in the world of the Paris Agreement,
international governance has a role to play in
the development of tools and methodologies 
and reviewing their application. The core chal-
lenge for international governance is the con-
nection of additionality to the level of ambition 
of the host country’s NDC. Even if a proposed 
activity is additional to the current level of am-
bition/implementation, it may still be short of
what would be required from the country if its 
fair share was taken as a benchmark. But it 
seems highly unlikely that any form of interna-
tional governance will have a mandate to make 
such judgements.
Theoretically, the risk of generating new “hot 
air” could be mitigated by tying eligibility to
participate in Article 6 to the level of ambition
of the NDC. However, the political viability of 
this approach is probably low. The same may 
apply to Brazil’s proposal to limit eligibility to
generate and transfer ITMOs to absolute emis-
sion reductions.
Decoupling the determination of additionality 
from the NDCs by using approaches such as 
best available technology values could help
overcoming this problem to some extent, but is
probably viable only for a limited number of 
sectors. 
Where such approaches are not viable, the only 
measure of containing the risk of low-ambition 
coalitions may be to rely on the responsibility of 
potential buyers of ITMOs, transparency, nam-
ing and shaming. Discussions should explore 
what technical provisions could be useful to fa-
cilitate such transparency. Two candidates are: 
• Parties using Article 6 could be required to 
report how their use of Article 6 has helped 
them increase ambition as required by Arti-
cle 6.1. This reporting could be made sub-
ject of the international review under the 
PA’s transparency mechanism.
• Transfers of ITMOs could be limited to the 
partners that directly participate in the Arti-
cle 6 activity to prevent the dilution of re-
sponsibility that would occur if the final us-
er of the ITMO is different from the 
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